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Abstract 
Although still very important trade partners, the relative significance of the U.S.’ and Japan’s 
economic relationship has dwindled over the years with the rise of China and other Southeast 
Asian nations. Also reducing the relative significance of the relationship has been a plethora of 
free trade agreements that the two nations have struck with other countries. This paper argues 
that two events, the U.S. shale gas boom and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant 
disaster, set up a capability and a need between the U.S. and Japan that can expose a beneficial 
economic opportunity for both nations.  
 
For the U.S., the capability is exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG). Following the shale gas 
boom, today, the U.S. is the world’s leader in shale gas production. Depending on future 
conditions, exporting will increase annual U.S. revenue by about $2.6 billion to almost $32.9 
billion, with the high end of the range occurring in unconstrained LNG exporting scenarios, 
based on the government-commissioned NERA Economic Consulting macroeconomic study. 
The conclusion of the study is that exporting LNG has overall net benefits for the U.S. economy.  
 
For Japan, the need matches the capability of the U.S. On March 11th, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude 
earthquake resulted in a nuclear crisis because of damage to several reactors at the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant, spreading hazardous radiation levels into the nearby environment. 
This led to a public backlash and a public policy of avoiding reliance on nuclear energy, leaving 
Japan with large energy needs. The most viable replacement for nuclear energy is LNG. 
  
With Japan’s energy needs and with government studies lending support to the benefits of 
exporting domestic LNG, the U.S. has a unique opportunity to utilize its vast shale gas supplies 
not only to export to Japan, the largest importer of natural gas, but also to use this as leverage in 
forming a free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan. An FTA with Japan that includes national 
treatment of natural gas would better facilitate trade of U.S. exports to Japan, as exporting to 
non-FTA nations is subject to stricter U.S. government regulations. With current LNG pricing 
arbitrage opportunities between Asia and the U.S. and with one third of Japan’s LNG contracts 
expiring in the next three to four years, the timing is opportune for a JUSFTA. If the U.S. acts 
quickly in negotiating a JUSFTA, it will enable U.S. exporters to capitalize on premium-ensured 
contracts that generally span twenty years or longer. Furthermore, the recently implemented 
South Korea – United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) can serve both as an impetus 
and in many ways as a template for a JUSFTA.  
 
For South Korea, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout and the need to reform its 
economy was the impetus for negotiating an FTA with the U.S. Japan has a much different, 
albeit still noteworthy, circumstance that could propel it to undergo serious negotiations for a 
Japan-United States free trade agreement (JUSFTA) – its energy needs. According to one 
analysis, a full JUSFTA, assuming a conservative 10% liberalization of services, would roughly 
double trade between the two nations (according to a gravity model analysis) and would increase 
Japan’s net welfare by 2.7% of GDP (about $130 billion at 2007 levels) and the U.S.’s welfare 
by 1.1% of GDP (about $150 billion annually). Thus, not only would a need best be matched to a 
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Historically, the Japan-U.S. alliance has been vital in the post-World War II era, 
benefitting both countries economically and allowing the U.S. to have a significant security role 
and military presence in East Asia. Economically, among non-North American countries, Japan 
is the U.S.’ second-largest export and second-largest import market.  
Currently, Japan and the U.S. conduct trade using the United States-Japan Economic 
Harmonization Initiative that was agreed upon by President Obama and Prime Minister Naoto 
Kan in November 2010, which lays out that the two sides meet on many occasions (Cooper, 
U.S.-Japan Economic Relations). Although still very important trade partners, the relative 
significance of the U.S.’ and Japan’s economic relationship has dwindled over the years with the 
rise of China and other Southeast Asian countries as growing economies. In 1994, 38.6% of 
Japanese exports went to the nine largest economies in Southeast Asia – this figure grew to 
52.8% in 2011. Although running a trade deficit with Japan, the U.S.’ focus has shifted much 
more to China, with whom in 2010 the U.S. had a trade deficit of $295.5 billion (Cooper, U.S.-
Japan Economic Relations). 
Also reducing the relative significance of the relationship has been a plethora of free 
trade agreements that the two nations have struck with other countries – for the U.S., this 
includes NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, 
Morocco, Bahrain, the Dominican Republic and Central America, Oman, Peru, Panama, 
Colombia, and South Korea; for Japan, this includes Singapore, Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, the 





This weakening of the Japan-U.S. alliance has manifested itself in many other ways. For 
example, the number of Japanese scientists doing research in the U.S. is half of what it was ten 
years ago; and the number of Japanese students at American universities is half of what it was 
ten years ago. These students are not avoiding English – in fact, the number of Japanese students 
going to other English-speaking countries has been increasing (Curtis). Although international 
universities have been improving, which is one factor for the departure of Japanese scientists and 
students from the U.S., the dramatic reduction in only ten years is nonetheless telling. 
One popular proposal for strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance is having Japan join the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free trade agreement currently being negotiated 
among eleven countries – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, the U.S. and Vietnam. In late 2011, Japan announced that it was seeking 
counsel and exploring the possibility of joining the negotiations.  Japan has completed 
discussions with six of the aforementioned countries, all of which support Japan’s participation 
in the partnership. The Obama administration has said that Japan needs to address three main 
issues before it will lend its endorsement: Japanese restrictions on U.S. beef imports, regulations 
and policies that favor state-run insurance companies like Japan Post, and market access for the 
U.S. automobile manufacturers. If Japan were to address these three areas and join the TPP, it 
would be considered a de facto JUSFTA (Cooper, Japan’s Possible Entry). With so many 
countries bringing their own demands to the table and Japan’s weak political system, it is still 
questionable if leaders would be able to make this a reality for the Japanese. For the purposes of 
this paper, the assumption is made that Japan will fail to join the TPP; with this assumption, this 




This paper argues that two events, the U.S. shale gas boom and the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear power plant disaster, set up a capability and a need between the U.S. and Japan that can 
expose a beneficial economic opportunity for both nations. Specifically, this paper asserts that 
these events create an impetus for a free trade agreement between Japan and the U.S., and that 
the recently implement South Korea – United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) can 
serve as a template for such a deal. Other than easing LNG trade, another basis for a JUSFTA are 
the macroeconomic benefits that Japan and the U.S. will realize both from the increased LNG 
trade and from the increased trade and investment that free trade produces. An additional benefit 
of a JUSFTA would be to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance to secure national security 
objectives and for the U.S. to solidify its leadership in shaping the direction of the Far East, 
especially with a rising China and the nuclear threat of North Korea; however, that is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
 
In the early 2000s, the decision whether to import a large amount of natural gas from 
foreign nations was a major public policy issue. Natural gas is transported between nations by 
two primary means – pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade. If transportation is 
overseas, LNG must be used. LNG is natural gas that has been cooled to an extreme condensed 
liquid state for ease of storage and transport, until it is received and transformed back into an 
expanded, gaseous state. Major investments and facilities are required for the importing, 
exporting, liquefaction, and regasification of LNG. According to Luther, Parfomak, and Ratner, 




growth in net natural gas imports between 1997 and 2020 from 12.9% to 15.5% of domestic 
consumption. In the latter half of the 2000s, with domestic natural gas supplies limited, five new 
LNG import facilities were built, and previously built ones were expanded.  
However, in 2008, a technique to unearth new sources of natural gas called hydraulic 
fracturing, or “fracking”, which entails drilling deep into rock shale formations and blasting  a 
mix of water and chemicals, unearthed an unforeseen supply of domestic natural gas. There has 
been concerns voiced by some about the environmental impacts of fracking by several groups, 
including the Sierra Club; thus far, the technique’s existence has come under no serious 
regulatory threat and this paper assumes that fracking will not be outlawed in the foreseeable 
future. With the shale gas boom, the domestic natural gas market soon became oversupplied and 
prices plummeted from the $12/MMBtu (thousand cubic feet) range to the $2/MMBtu range in 
less than half a decade. With European and Asian natural gas trading between $11/MMBtu -
$15/MMBtu as of March 2012 (Levi, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports”), exporting, not 
importing, presented an arbitrage opportunity. 
The following sections will discuss the capability that the United States now has that can 
lead to a free trade agreement with Japan. First, we will discuss the background and history of 
the shale gas boom in the U.S. and why the U.S. is in a unique position to capitalize on the U.S. 
shale gas boom. This section also explains the process the U.S. undergoes before it can export to 
FTA partner nations and non-FTA partner nations. Secondly, this section argues that the U.S. 
should export LNG for several reasons. Specifically, this paper looks at previous sources and 
studies that provided evidence of the benefits of exporting natural gas, including a study done by 




benefits presented in a recently released government-commissioned study from NERA Economic 
Consulting. 
 
Background of U.S. Shale Gas Boom  
 
Fracking, as we know it today, originated in 1947, when Standard Oil of Indiana (later 
Amoco, now part of BP) used high-pressure liquids to break up limestone formation 
underground in southwestern Kansas (Truth Squad). In the 1970s, a partnership developed 
between private companies, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Gas Research Institute 
(GRI) (Institute for Energy Research). The 1973 OPEC embargo of the U.S. and the oil shock 
following the 1979 Iranian revolution encouraged the government to invest in oil and gas 
production research (spending $1.5 billion between 1978 and 2000) (Truth Squad).  
 In the 1980s and 1990s, Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation made shale gas 
production commercially viable in North-Central Texas after conducting experiments in Barnett 
Shale. By 2005, Barnett Shale was producing almost half a trillion cubic feet of natural gas per 
year. Other shale gas fields – Fayetteville Shale in North Arkansas, Haynesville in Southwestern 
Arkansas, Northwest Louisiana and West Texas, Marcellus in Pennsylvania and surrounding 
states, Woodford in Oklahoma, and Eagle Ford in Texas were developed. Such expansion was 
possible because small, independent companies were willing to take large risks, there was a large 
existing pipeline network in the U.S., there was availability of drilling rigs, and finally there was 
available geologic information from state regulators (Institute for Energy Research). 
Today, the U.S. is the world’s leader in shale gas production, with the world’s second 




according to a study by the EIA). Outside of the U.S., development of fracking and other shale 
gas technologies is slow because of a lack of knowledge regarding geology of shale formations, 
lack of infrastructure to drill and transport the fuel, and government ownership of the mineral 
rights. The shale boom in the U.S. happened due to a unique combination of private ownership 
of mineral rights, interest of small oil and gas developers, and availability of geologic data 
(Institute for Energy Research).  
Fracking is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for natural gas production, but it 
is a relatively new, dynamic means by which the U.S. has become one of the lowest cost 
providers of natural gas in the world. Whether this U.S. competitive advantage can persist 
depends much upon the success of competing foreign nations to utilize the technology 
successfully. Among major countries with significant shale gas resources, possible contenders 
for increased fracking development include China, Argentina, and Poland. China has problems 
fully utilizing fracking technologies because its formations are located in arid or heavily 
populated areas. Fracking uses water with chemicals to break shale rock, and thus the lack of 
water is a problem. Argentina nationalized the assets of its major oil and gas producer, reducing 
interest from outside investors. Poland experimented with drilling but found low amounts of gas 
produced from the first few wells drilled, and further efforts have stagnated (Institute for Energy 
Research). Because of these foreign countries’ limitations, the U.S. may very well have a 
competitive advantage in its access to shale gas supplies, especially if the aforementioned issues 
persist. This paper assumes that there is no major shift away from government ownership of 






Exporting to FTA and Non-FTA Nations 
 
Projects to export LNG, by Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, must be approved by both 
the DOE (for the right to export) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (for 
the right to build the necessary facility). Most US FTAs include a clause for “national treatment” 
of LNG exports, meaning, by Section 3 of the US Natural Gas Act, exports from the US to FTA 
countries must be granted immediate approval by the US DOE. For Japan and other non-FTA 
countries, the DOE has to consider each application individually and determine if the exporting 
would be in the US public interest – this is followed by a wait period for public comments and 
replies. (Yoshii, et al.) Thus, it is more difficult for exporting firms to engage in trade with a non-
FTA country, and conversely, having an FTA with a country makes exporting LNG there more 
simple and feasible. This is the first basis for the recommendation to engage Japan in an FTA – 
so that the number one importer of LNG in the world can easily trade with U.S. firms. 
 Although the U.S. exports by pipeline, liquefying and exporting natural gas overseas has 
only occurred at the ConocoPhillips-owned Kenai plant in Alaska, where small volumes were 
exported to Japan from 1969 to December 2011. Cheniere Energy’s $10 billion LNG export 
facility at Sabine Pass, LA, has been the only continental export facility to receive authorization 
from both the DOE and FERC to export to non-FTA nations thus far (Luther, Parfomak, and 
Ratner). There were roadblocks because of environmental and economic concerns. Studies on the 
environmental impacts of fracking have been mostly inconclusive, whereas the majority of 
recent economic studies have lent credence to the prospect of exporting LNG. Notably, one 
government (EIA) study and another third party government-commissioned (NERA Economic 




on its macroeconomic effects, have overall shown support for the export of LNG, and thus more 
approvals are expected in the near future. 
The facilities that have applied with the DOE for authorization to export LNG are Sabine 
Pass Liquefaction, Freeport LNG Expansion, Lake Charles Exports, Carib Energy, Dominion 
Cove Point LNG, Jordan Cove Energy Project, Cameron LNG, Freeport LNG Expansion, Gulf 
Coast LNG Export, Gulf LNG Liquefaction Company, LNG Development Company, SB Power 
Solutions, Southern LNG Company, Excelerate Liquefaction Solutions, Golden Pass Products, 
Cheniere Marketing, Main Pass Energy Hub, CE FLNG, and Waller LNG Services, which have 
all been approved to ship LNG to FTA countries, with Pangea LNG Holdings, Magnolia LNG, 
Trunkline LNG Export, and Gasfin Development USA pending approval. Outside of Sabine Pass 
Liquefaction, all of the rest are pending a DOE Review (Manger) to export to non-FTA nations 
or did not apply for the rights to ship to non-FTA countries. The total amount of non-FTA 
applications received in terms of volume is 24.80 Bcf/d (billion cubic feet per day) (as of January 
11, 2013); FTA applications received total 31.41 Bcf/d (U.S. Department of Energy). Clearly, 
there is much interest from U.S. companies to export LNG, especially out of the Gulf Coast 
region. In the next section, this paper analyzes the reasons the U.S. government should swiftly 
begin approving these export applications. 
 
Reasons the U.S. should export LNG 
 
The following sections show first how previous studies – notably an EIA government 
study, a Deloitte study, and a The Hamilton Project study by Michael Levi - and the recently 




potential benefits of allowing LNG exportation. In a later section, this paper will explore the 
desire of the Japanese government to procure U.S. supplies of LNG, leading to the proposal of 
approaching Japan to negotiate an FTA with national treatment for LNG trade as an impetus for 
Japan to negotiate. 
There are several reasons, even without considering the recent NERA macroeconomic 
study, that permitting U.S. LNG exports is advisable. First, the U.S. exportation of LNG will 
only cause a slight increase in domestic natural gas prices. Using its integrated North American 
Power, Coal, and World Gas Model, Deloitte MarketPoint found that domestic natural gas prices 
on a weighted-average basis would increase by only $.12/MMBtu from 2016 to 2035, assuming 
a reasonable exportation of six Bcf/d of LNG, approximately two Bcf/d from three different 
export facilities – Sabine Pass, and the facilities pending authorization at Freeport and Lake 
Charles. This increase represents a change of 1.7% over the projected average natural gas price 
of $7.09/MMBtu (one million British thermal units) from 2016 to 2035 (Adams, Dunn, Choi, 
and Ihne). The price impact of exports is marginal since future exports will be estimated in 
advance, and all parties will respond accordingly, mitigating the price impact.  
Additionally, LNG export projects are likely to be backed by long-term contracts. 
According to Das, Japan places much emphasis on mutual trust when engaging in long-term 
contracts. Given the relatively strong post-WWII alliance between Japan and the U.S., this bodes 
well for U.S. LNG exporters attempting to reach significant deals with Japan, especially in 
comparison to some other potential partners with whom Japan has territorial disputes, such as 
Russia. Long-term deals for the U.S. will find precedent with the long term contract agreed upon 
from Cheniere’s Sabine Pass. Cheniere’s contracts price the exported natural gas at 115 percent 




“A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports”). This keeps Cheniere’s exposure to changes in 
domestic or overseas gas prices at a minimum, ensuring profits in the future. In his report for the 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Medlock also recognized that due to the elastic supply 
(especially after the shale boom) of U.S. natural gas, domestic prices would be minimally 
affected by exports. Since electricity and gas bills account for only 4% of U.S. consumer 
spending (Philips), the modest price increase should not deter from exporting LNG.  
There is likely an abundant amount of shale natural gas available in the United States, 
which will help keep domestic prices low even with exports. Since the shale gas boom created an 
oversupply of natural gas, producers have been trying to cease drilling. Only 484 natural gas rigs 
are currently open, half the amount of rigs open at the same time one year earlier (Philips). 
Likely, exports would allow producers to fully utilize supplies that would otherwise have to stay 
in the ground. Since shale gas is a new development, one can speculate there is potentially much 
that has yet to be discovered – much like the ever increasing discovered world oil reserves. The 
EIA estimates that shale gas will make up 47% of total U.S. production in 2035, much more than 
the 23% share it made up in 2011. Also, major energy companies have invested significant 
amounts of capital in shale gas exploration. For example, ExxonMobil purchased the shale gas 
development company XTO for $34.9 billion. Purchases like these lower the marginal cost of 
future production, and hinting at increased future shale production. The incremental 2.2 Tcf 
(trillion cubic feet) of annual LNG exports are trivial in comparison to the EIA’s latest estimate 
of technically recoverable U.S. gas, 2,587 Tcf (Conti). 
Exporting means increased production means increased U.S. revenue. According to 
Michael Levi, senior fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations, the six Bcf/d level of exports 




billion per year. Levi estimates that for a full six Bcf/d of exports, the U.S. economy would gain 
roughly $3.1 billion to $3.7 billion each year: annually gaining about $1 billion from selling gas 
at a higher price overseas rather than domestically, about $2.5 billion from the new gas 
production, about $420 million because of utilizing current import infrastructure rather than 
building export facilities from scratch, and losing about $400 million due to lower domestic 
consumption ( “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports”). The EIA, in its report, estimate that 
between 2015 and 2035 producers would net between $14 billion and $32 billion from exports, 
depending on the scenario. The EIA also notes that since natural gas exports would lead to more 
coal production, domestic coal producers would also benefit from exporting LNG, with coal 
revenues increasing by at most 6.2% from 2015 to 2035 (Conti). 
Exporting LNG could give the U.S. leverage in trade negotiations. The U.S. joined Japan 
and Europe at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in lodging complaints against China for 
restricting exports of its rare earth metals, which are vital to various segments of the U.S. clean 
energy industry (Levi, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports”). If the U.S. were to limit 
exports of LNG, it would seem hypocritical in challenging China. Furthermore, the largest 
importer of natural gas is Japan, a non-FTA nation. After the March 2011 tsunami disaster at 
Fukushima, Japan’s need for natural gas and non-nuclear forms of energy has skyrocketed. If the 
U.S. were to help Japan in its time of tragedy, the U.S. would have leverage to gain concessions 
from Japan. Under U.S. regulations, it is a much simpler process to gain approval to export LNG 
to FTA nations, a major reason to consider forming an FTA with Japan. Nonetheless, as 
currently stands, U.S. non-FTA countries comprise 91% of global GDP (Philips) – it could help 




FTA partners or more non-FTA export licenses, despite the more rigorous application and 
approval process, are approved. 
Exports could help lower the current account deficit. The U.S. has a current account 
deficit with Japan in particular, and exporting to the number one importer of natural gas would 
help in this case. Six Bcf/d of exports would net export revenue of about $20 billion, about five 
percent of the 2010 and 2011 current account deficit (Levi, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas 
Exports”). The actual impact would be smaller, as exports of products that used natural gas as an 
input would decrease, and U.S. consumption (and thus imports) would increase. Nevertheless, 
there would be a net reduction in the current account deficit.  
LNG exports could also lower global greenhouse gas emissions. By exporting natural 
gas, we lower the price of natural gas for foreign nations, thus encouraging them to switch from 
less clean forms of energy such as coal. For example, currently China fulfills only 4% of its 
energy needs with natural gas, as opposed to the average of 16% (Sotolongo). Levi estimates that 
with six Bcf/d of natural gas exports, the avoided climate damages, setting damages for 
emissions at $21 per ton of carbon dioxide, would be $2 billion annually. 
LNG exports would create more jobs than jobs it would cause to be lost. According to 
Levi, exporting natural gas would create a large amount of temporary jobs. Cheniere’s facility 
alone will take roughly two years to build and support 3,000 jobs at its peak. Thus, for six Bcf/d 
of exports, as many as 8,000 temporary jobs would be created. Levi also estimates that for six 
Bcf/d of gas exports, approximately 25,000 jobs in the natural gas industry would emerge, along 
with 40,000 jobs along the supply chain. Higher natural gas prices due to exports would, 




estimates, but the takeaway is that job gains due to exporting natural gas are likely to exceed job 
losses (“A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports”). 
Beyond economics, by exporting gas overseas, the U.S. is competing with foreign 
competitors, like Russia and the Middle East. Although beyond the scope of this paper, 
strategically and politically the U.S. would benefit from stealing a share of global influence from 
these competitors. Although some argue that by exporting LNG we are helping oil exporters, 
some of whom tend to be hostile to us, these same oil exporters, like Iran and Russia, often are 
exporters of natural gas, and thus we would be lessening their revenue from natural gas (Levi, “A 
Strategy for Natural Gas Exports”). 
David Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage is widely assumed among economists; 
this theory states that the ability to freely trade delivers net economic benefits to all parties 
involved, and that governments barring trade create negative economic consequences. When 
trade becomes unprofitable, companies will withdraw the number of exports – no government 
restrictions are necessary. This is a theoretical reason for having no constraint on LNG exports.  
If companies can lock in long-term, market-based contracts like Cheniere Energy has done, U.S. 
profits will be guaranteed for decades, with only counterparty risk (which can be insured 
against). FERC, before approving facilities to be built, can check how the companies plan to sell 
the LNG. If they have sound, profitable plans, especially if they have agreed-upon contracts that 
are tied to spot markets and guarantee a premium, they should be approved. 
This section addressed some of the commonly held reasons of supporting the export of 
U.S. LNG before the NERA Economic Consulting study of December, 2012. The previous 
discussion provides solid evidence that by treating LNG no differently than other market 




If the approval process to export LNG to non-FTA nations remains as vigorous as it is today, the 
above further provides reasons that reaching an FTA with energy-needy Japan, the number one 
importer of LNG, would help the process of U.S. exporters agreeing to long-term LNG contracts 
with Japanese importers, and thus help the U.S. economy to lock up profits. Although convinced 
from the EIA study that there would be no domestic price increases due to the exportation of 
LNG, the U.S. government wanted solid evidence, beyond the then-available studies and reports. 
Thus, the EIA commissioned NERA Economic Consulting to conduct an analysis on the specific 
macroeconomic effect of the U.S. exporting LNG. This study’s results are explained in the 
following section. 
 
Results of NERA Economic Consulting study 
 
The long-awaited second and final government-commissioned study on the 
macroeconomic impacts of LNG exports from the United States, titled Macroeconomic Impacts 
of LNG Exports from the United States, was submitted to the public on December 3, 2012. W. 
David Montgomery led the project. The study was contracted for by the Office of Fossil Energy 
of the U.S. DOE (DOE/FE), and was conducted by NERA Economic Consulting, a third party 
consulting firm. The first study, done by the EIA, had assessed the effects different levels and 
rates of LNG exports would have on domestic natural gas prices. The EIA study, however, did 
not assess any of the macroeconomic effects, nor did it determine if exports could be sold in the 
global market at prices high enough to support the domestic prices. NERA used the domestic 
price results established in the first EIA study as inputs for its own study. After NERA’s study 




were issued, some from prominent politicians, others from everyday citizens. There were both 
criticisms and praises made of the work NERA conducted and the models NERA utilized. Reply 
comments to these initial comments were accepted until February 25, 2013. The NERA study, 
initial comments, reply comments, and other related documents can all be viewed on the U.S. 
DOE Office of Fossil Energy’s website.  
 The NERA study set out to determine the price levels at which U.S. LNG could be sold 
in the world market, given different scenarios of global and domestic conditions. Each situation 
has a price point at which the next unit of natural gas would be more economically supplied by a 
region other than the U.S. A worldwide natural gas supply and demand model was used to help 
determine under what situations said pricing point is met. In addition, the NERA study set out to 
determine the economic impact on the U.S. of choosing to allow LNG exports. Revenue streams 
include additional profit to producers for selling higher volumes of natural gas, an improvement 
in the U.S. balance of trade, any foreign direct investment (FDI) for the construction of LNG 
liquefaction facilities, additional wealth for U.S. households, and increased investment values for 
those who hold stock in natural gas producers. The costs include the increased price of domestic 
natural gas and electricity for consumers, increased energy costs for production in certain 
domestic industries, and the costs that said industries pass on to their customers.  
 NERA uses the partial-equilibrium model called Global Natural Gas Model (GNGM) to 
estimate the amount of natural gas production, consumption, and trade by each of twelve regions. 
NERA then used its own proprietary macroeconomic “NewERA” model to forecast the impact 
of policy, regulatory, and economic factors on the energy sectors and the economy. The model 
inputs all of the producing regions and their LNG export plants, and final demand of the 




accounts for all real-life impactful activity that can be estimated, like pipeline imports into the 
U.S. from Canada. The “NewERA” model then outputs the demand and supply of all goods and 
services, prices for all the commodities, and the resulting trade effects (imports and exports). The 
model also computes gross regional product, consumption, investment, disposable income, and 
changes in income from labor, capital, and resources.  
 Many scenarios were run through the model for simulation; there were different U.S. 
supply and demand conditions assumed, different caps on exports and rate of export introduction 
simulated, and different assumptions of global supply and demand. In total, there were 63 
distinct scenarios that were simulated.  
 First, there were three different world outlooks simulated: International Reference, 
Demand Shock, and Supply/Demand Shock. As seen below (courtesy of the NERA report), the 
International Reference is a realistic case of plausible conditions. The Demand Shock Case is 
different only in that it assumes Japan retires all of its nuclear plants due to the March 11 
tragedy. Supply/Demand Shock takes this a step further, assuming South Korea follows suit in 
eliminating nuclear power and that planned future facilities in Oceania, Southeast Asia, and 
Africa do not build liquefaction plants that are currently in planning.  For the sake of this paper, 
we will assume the Demand Shock case, as recent developments support the theory that Japan 
may retire its nuclear energy program. However, unlike the past prime minister, Japan’s current 
Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has expressed an interest in maintaining some role for nuclear 
power in Japan’s energy future. The end of this section will address the hypothetical scenario in 





 The full range of U.S. scenarios that were inputted into the model is based on U.S. supply 
and LNG export quotas. For U.S. Supply, the Reference case is the EIA’s estimate; High EUR 
(Estimated Ultimate Recovery) is the case where domestic natural gas supplies in new, undrilled 
wells are 50% than reference estimates; and Low EUR is the case where natural gas supplies per 
shale gas well for new, undrilled wells is assumed 50% lower than the reference estimate.  
 For LNG export quotas, there are seven different combinations:  
• Low/Slow: 6 Bcf/d, reached at a rate of 1 Bcf/d per year 
• Low/Rapid: 6 Bcf/d, reached at a rate of 3 Bcf/d per year 
• High/Slow: 12 Bcf/d, reached at a rate of 1 Bcf/d per year 
• High/Rapid: 12 Bcf/d, reached at a rate of 3 Bcf/d per year 
• Low/Slowest: 6 Bcf/d, reached at a rate of 0.5 Bcf/d per year 
• Unlimited: No limits set on U.S. LNG exports 






 As you can see, the three U.S. supply cases and the seven LNG Export Capacity 
scenarios (including the No-Export Capacity cases) created a matrix of 21 combinations. This, 








For the sake of brevity, the big picture results are summed up as follows (if you would like to 
learn more about the procedures, details, or intermediate retails, the study is available online for 
the public): 
• The U.S. can profitably export if the global demand exceeds the Reference case or if the 
U.S. costs of production are lower than the Reference case. Since this paper assumes the Demand 
Shock case, the U.S. will be able to profitably export LNG. 
• Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports are positive in all cases. Some of the cases with 
no constraints also led to more than 12 Bcf/d as the ideal amount for U.S. exports. In any case, 
for every scenario there was no greater benefit attained than the No-Constraint case. Across all 
scenarios, U.S. real GDP remained the same or increased as the volume of LNG exports 
increased. 
• Sources of income shift, but for the average U.S. consumer the benefit from export 
expansion trumps the losses from any wage losses in manufacturing sectors 
• Any negative employment effects that allowing LNG exports causes would be in a very 
narrow segment: One-half of one percent of U.S. employees works in manufacturing jobs that 
have energy expenditures more than 5% of their output – these would be the only industries 
threatened by foreign competition because of LNG exporting 
 
Depending on the scenario, exporting will increase annual revenue by about $2.6 billion 
to almost $32.9 billion, with the high end of the range occurring with the unconstrained 
scenarios. Under the U.S. Reference cases, GDP increases range from $5 billion to $20 billion; 




GDP could increase by $4.4 billion. The conclusion of the study is that exporting LNG has 
overall net benefits for the economy. 
This paper assumes that nuclear power, due to the disaster of March 11, 2011 and mass 
public sentiment opposing its reinstatement, will not return to prominence in Japan. The previous 
prime minister was in support of banning nuclear power; the current prime minister is in support 
of some role for nuclear power. Given the short terms of prime ministers in modern day Japan 
(there have been eight prime ministers since 2000, with one, Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), 
breaking the mold by serving more than two years), the sentiment of the current prime minister 
likely will not determine Japan’s nuclear future. The public uproar, as demonstrated by opinion 
polls and protests, against nuclear power is a more telling sign. However, the current prime 
minister’s stance cannot be ignored and the possibility of nuclear power regaining a significant 
place in Japan’s energy future must be considered. 
 There are two reasons this paper still recommends the U.S. government placing no 
constraints on LNG exports even with uncertainty regarding Japan’s nuclear future. First, across 
any scenario in the NERA Economic Consulting study, the U.S. economy will not be negatively 
affected by allowing LNG exports. In fact, the study found that all export scenarios are welfare-
improving for U.S. consumers, and although causing the highest rises in domestic prices, the 
largest welfare improvements result from the high export scenarios across the differing U.S. and 
International conditions (the export revenues and the return on investment from liquefaction 
plants exceed the cost of increased domestic natural gas prices). Furthermore, in each scenario 
having no caps on the U.S. LNG export quantity is either tied for or is the best case scenario for 
real U.S. GDP – meaning that given the uncertainty of future conditions in Japan and in shale gas 




 Secondly, regardless of the future uncertain scenarios, the Cheniere Energy’s LNG export 
contracts, the first U.S. Gulf Coast LNG export contracts finalized, set a precedent for future 
long-term contract. Cheniere’s contracts are tied to U.S. prices, plus a sufficient premium that 
guarantees a premium for producers. Since Japan likely is interested in long-term contracts, and 
the bulk quantity of export contracts is generally long-term, if the U.S. acts quickly to export 
LNG, U.S. exporters could finalize contracts guaranteeing premiums and thus guaranteeing 
macroeconomic benefits for the U.S. (for twenty years or more). Japan, as the number one 
importer of LNG and an industrialized nation with an undecided energy future, would be eager to 
negotiate LNG contracts with its ally, the U.S., since Japan values mutual trust and reliability of 
supply when agreeing to long-term contracts. Having detailed the energy exporting capabilities 
of the U.S. and the resulting macroeconomic gains resulting from these capabilities, the energy 
needs of Japan are discussed in the next section. 
   
Japan’s Energy Needs 
 
 This section follows the previous section by establishing that the U.S.’ capability of 
exporting LNG could directly benefit Japan because of Japan’s energy needs. Discussed are a 
history of the March 11th Japanese tsunami and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, and the 








March 11, 2011 
 
On March 11th, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck the coast near Japan’s Tohoku 
region (Garvizu). The resulting tsunami claimed 20,000 lives, over half a million buildings, and a 
half million Japanese were displaced. To make matters worse, a nuclear crisis occurred because 
of damage to several reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, spreading hazardous 
radiation levels into the nearby environment. The Japanese government called for a nuclear 
emergency, evacuating 80,000 residents within a 20 kilometer radius of the plant. The 
earthquake caused physical damage, not including the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, estimated to 
be between $195-305 billion (Chanlett-Avery, Cooper, and Manyin). 
In the 1990s there were many nuclear accidents, including a 1999 incident in Tokaimura 
that killed two workers, which fueled public disapproval of nuclear energy. The amount of 
people who felt “very uneasy” because of nuclear energy increased from 21% to 52% from 
before to after this incident. The Fukushima crisis has generated an even greater antipathy 
towards nuclear energy. An Asahi Shimbun poll in June 2011 indicated that 74% wanted to 
gradually phase-out all dependence on nuclear energy. (Adams) Concerns have especially arisen 
over the government’s dependence on Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), owner of the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, due to the close relations between regulators and 
utilities (Chanlett-Avery, Cooper, and Manyin). For decades, the ten Japanese vertically 
integrated utilities claimed monopoly control of the generation and distribution of electrical 
power. All of Japan’s 54 nuclear reactors were shut down; when one was reopened in June of 




Before March 11, 2011, Japan’s 54 nuclear power plants supplied 30 percent of the 
nation’s electricity (Garvizu), and the government planned to build 20 more reactors by 2030 
(Chanlett-Avery, Cooper, and Manyin). Japan had planned on expanding its dependence on 
nuclear energy from one-third to one-half of electricity generation by 2030 (Adams). After the 
accident, in July 2011, then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced that Japan intended to rid 
itself off of all reliance on nuclear energy to meet its energy needs (Garvizu). In 2012, only one 
of the 54 Japanese nuclear reactors was operating (Adams). 
 
 
Japan and LNG 
 
Worsening the energy situation for Japan, household and transport energy costs are rising 
– increasingly more Japanese own automobiles and demand for air conditioning has risen. 
Although many want to replace the nuclear energy with renewables, cost remains a significant 
obstacle (Adams). 
The most viable replacement for nuclear energy is LNG. LNG is popular among fossil 
fuels because it has relatively low carbon emissions. The Economist Intelligence Unit, which 
conservatively believes that nuclear energy will continue to play a significant role in Japan’s 
energy future, still predicted that natural gas demand in Japan will double between 2011 and 
2020, as a proportion of the energy mix rising from 19% to 26% in that time span (Adams). 





 Even after including nuclear power, Japan’s domestic energy resources are very limited, 
amounting to about 16% of its own energy needs. In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan would have 
preferred to rely on natural gas imports from neighboring countries, but the most logical 
provider, the Soviet Union, was, by alliance, its opponent in the Cold War that time. Among its 
natural gas use in 2009, 91% came from LNG.  Today, Japan is the world’s number one importer 
of LNG, importing 3.18 Tcf in 2009; this number is expected to rise to 4 Tcf by 2035. In 2015, it 
is projected that Japan’s LNG import share will be 35% of the Pacific and 16% of the world 
market. (Das) In fact, due to the disasters at the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant, it is a strong 
possibility that Japan will look to weave itself off nuclear power, and those estimates of LNG use 
could increase.  
 In 2009, Japan imported roughly 70% of its LNG from Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, 
and Qatar (descending, in that order) (Das). Japan stresses its desire to diversify its sources of 
imports for pricing and stability reasons; reliability of its suppliers is key. Qatar, Australia, 
Malaysia, and Russia are the main current suppliers that are possible choices to supply increased 
amounts of future LNG to Japan. Russia’s supply will most likely increase, but by how much is 
unknown due to the question of the reliability of Russian supply. In times of dispute in the past, 
Russia has threatened to cut its supply of LNG, and there is a risk of price gouging by the state-
controlled gas company, Gazprom (Belogolova). In addition, it is likely that Russia will not want 
to ship its entire supply to East Asia, but rather will want to balance its gas exports between East 
Asia and Europe. Australia and Malaysia already supply 20% each, and it is unlikely Japan, 
given its desire to diversify, would want to source more from them if there was another source 
that offered Japan the ability to diversify.  Qatar, the world’s largest exporter of LNG, seems to 




leaves the U.S. as a natural choice, a choice that none of the previously mentioned contenders 
stack up to on all criteria. TEPCO Trading Corp. and Chubu Electric Power Co. officials have 
already demonstrated interest in importing U.S. LNG. (Das) Beyond natural gas, concerns about 
Japan’s reliance on volatile oil supplies from the Middle East has many in Japan calling for the 
U.S. to export its relatively cheap LNG (Chanlett-Avery, Cooper, Manyin). 
 “From all the aspects, U.S. LNG is a very, very shining treasure…for us,” said Hirohide 
Hirai, director of policy evaluation and public relations at Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry. “As you know, without nuclear power, LNG is the most promising, most 
reliable…alternative resource for us,” Hirai said (Belogolova). 
 To smooth out a diversified supply of LNG, the Japanese government has provided 
financing and incentives to fund LNG facility projects – not only is this a benefit in the obvious 
way that it is a source of financing, it is also beneficial because it increases Japanese FDI and 
further strengthens the U.S.-Japan relationship. 
 Recent development clouded Japan’s energy independence future even further. There 
were active faults near atomic plants in Fukui and Aomori prefectures discovered, creating more 
pressure for the Japanese government to stay away from nuclear energy. With such pressure, 
LNG has become a great choice to meet Japan’s energy needs – Japan’s LNG imports have 
steadily increased with all but two of Japan’s 50 nuclear reactors shut down. Japanese LNG 
imports surged by 18% from 2010 to 2011, and further increases are expected over the coming 
years (Das).  
As aforementioned, East Asian nations like Japan place a large emphasis on mutual trust 




have been supplying Japan with LNG from Alaska’s Kenai plant. (Das) These companies have 
established positive long-term relationships that other U.S. companies could also benefit from.  
Asia contributes 55% of the world LNG trade presently (Tham). Over the next 3-4 years, 
approximately one third of long term contracts in Japan are expiring representing a window of 
opportunity for new gas indices to be used (Tham). With the vital abundance of LNG the U.S. 
now has between its Gulf Coast and Alaskan North Slope, importing LNG from the U.S. 
provides an area that can help strengthen the vital alliance and provide economic benefits to the 
two nations. In 2011, Alaska provided 7% of Japan’s LNG needs (Johnston). However, with 
pending approvals to greatly expand U.S. LNG capacity to export, Japan will likely be very 
interested in greatly increasing this number from the U.S. The current facility - Kenai - is 
shutting down, but Alaska’s North Slope is hoping to have exporting capabilities by 2019 
(Johnston). Additionally, as aforementioned, a myriad of companies are waiting to gain approval 
to export LNG out of the U.S.’ Gulf Coast region.  
 Outside of Alaska, Japan hopes to purchase about 30 million metric tons per year of LNG 
from Louisiana, Texas, and Maryland terminals. Osaka Gas Co. and Chubu Electric Power Co. 
already reached a deal last summer with Freeport (in Texas) to liquefy 4.4 million tons annually 
of LNG that should begin arriving in Japan in 2017, supposing Freeport is granted regulatory 
approval from the DOE in 2013 (Johnston). 
 
Tying it Together 
 
With a glut of natural gas, the U.S. likely would be more than willing to become a major 




terminals are located on the Gulf Coast, not the Pacific Coast, making shipments to Japan more 
costly. However, with the opening of the Panama Canal to LNG ships in 2014, LNG shipments 
will have a much quicker and more cost efficient access to Japan by the time export facilities 
have been completed (Das).  
 The Freeport LNG liquefaction project, expecting to begin LNG shipments in 2017, alone 
will create over 1,000 construction jobs in two to three years, and require over $2 billion of 
direct investment. According to Altos Management Partners, in total 17,000 to 21,000 jobs 
created in exploration and production and $2.7 billion spent annually on salaries, exploration, 
and production would occur just due to this one project. In July, Freeport signed contracts to 
supply Japanese companies – the utilities Osaka Gas Co. and Chubu Electric Power – with LNG. 
Recently, Freeport signed an agreement allowing a BP subsidiary to export these 4.4 million tons 
of LNG per year – bringing the current U.S. gas exports committed to 5 Bcf/d (Lefebvre). Randy 
Bhatia, an analyst with Capital One Southcoast, sees the previous export projections of 6 Bcf/d 
as underestimates now, “Consensus thinking on about 6 billion cubic feet a day probably needs 
to move up some” (Lefebvre). Clearly, demand for U.S. LNG contracts, especially from Japan, 
has exceeded previous expectations, an impetus to find the most convenient and effective way to 
engage the number one importer of LNG, Japan, to agree to more long-term contracts. The 
Sabine Pass project, with almost 30% higher capacity, would provide even more benefits to the 
economy (Das).  
 In terms of breaking even, Das estimates that the delivery cost to the liquefaction facility 
is $0.32/MMBtu, the liquefaction cost is $1.58/MMBtu, the LNG shipping cost is $0.89/MMBtu, 
and storage and regasification cost is $0.38/MMBtu; adding these to an estimated break-even 




at a Japanese LNG facility, will be about $7.17/MMBtu. In April 2011, the average price paid, 
according to Platts Japan/Korea Marker, for LNG shipments into Japan or Korea was 
$10.95/MMBtu (Das). Obviously, there is currently plenty of margin available to U.S. producers. 
With government studies lending support to the benefits of exporting domestic LNG and 
with Japan’s energy needs, the U.S. has a unique opportunity to utilize its vast shale gas supplies 
not only to export to Japan, the largest importer of natural gas, but also to use as leverage in 
obtaining a free trade agreement with Japan. An FTA with Japan that includes national treatment 




Having established the energy capabilities and energy needs of the U.S. and Japan, 
respectively, this next section discusses how matching that need and the opportunity creates an 
economic opportunity for the two nations. Specifically, this section argues that a free trade 
agreement between the two nations is a suitable method to match the need and capability, and 
also discusses additional benefits of the proposed Japan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (JUSFTA). 
The section begins with a discussion of free trade agreements and their benefits in general. Then, 
it explains why the timing for a JUSFTA is opportune, how the KORUS FTA can in some ways 
serve as both and impetus and a template for a JUSFTA, and concludes with a discussion of 







Free Trade Agreements 
 
According to export.gov, an FTA is “an agreement between two or more countries where 
the countries agree on certain obligations that affect trade in goods and services, and protections 
for investors and intellectual property rights, among other topics) (U.S. Free Trade 
Agreements).”  Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) open up foreign markets to U.S. exporters. The 
U.S.’ objectives in making FTAs are to reduce barriers to U.S. exports, guard U.S. interests 
competing abroad, and to improve the rule of law in the FTA partner country (U.S. Free Trade 
Agreements). The reduction of barriers, such as the reduction or elimination of tariffs, and a 
more transparent trading/investment system make it cheaper for U.S. companies to export 
goods/services to FTA partners. Other keys in an FTA include documenting rules of origin – 
designating which products qualify for FTA treatment based on where it originated from or was 
procured from.  
Countries form FTAs for a host of reasons – often economic or political.  Recently, one 
reason countries have decided to form FTAs is because of the slow process of trade in 
multilateral negotiations. The recent surge in FTAs globally coincided with the failure to 
implement the Doha Development Agenda round of negotiations in the WTO (Cooper, Free 
Trade Agreements). 
In addition to its current TPP negotiations, the U.S. has 14 FTAs with 20 different 
countries (U.S. Free Trade Agreement)) – Korea, Panama, Colombia, Australia, Bahrain, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Israel, Jordan, 
Morocco, Canada (NAFTA), Mexico (NAFTA), Oman, Peru, and Singapore. In 2010, 41% of 




world GDP. In addition, exports to those countries grew at a faster rate from 2009 to 2010, 23% 
to 20% (Free Trade Agreements). This is evidence for the increased amount of trade and 
cooperation among countries with FTAs, demonstrating how an FTA would be a viable option 
for restoring the weakening Japan-U.S. alliance. 
The 1980s began an era of private enterprises in an increasingly globalized context, and 
this increased the desire of firms to discover access to foreign markets. Multilateral agreements, 
especially those established by the WTO, were already in place, but oftentimes the pace of 
multilateral trade negotiations, with a standard template for many nations to follow, was too 
slow. Thus, bilateral free trade agreements started to spring up as a way to gain market access in 
foreign countries not only for goods but also for services. Free trade agreements also ease LNG 
trade under current DOE and FERC regulations. 
According to Brown and Stern, the most serious objection to free trade agreements is 
preferential treatment. Since any given agreement only applies between two countries (a bilateral 
agreement), then a country that forms free trade agreements with many different countries plays 
by different rules with all the said countries – the differences can make it more confusing for 
companies and could be costly if not understood. Free trade agreements, as noted by Brown and 
Stern, cause both trade liberalization (a good thing) and trade diversion (not such a good thing). 
Trade diversion occurs when the reduction of a tariff leads to more imports from a less efficient 
producer of a good and less of the goods from the more efficient producer (whether domestic 
producer or a rival foreign importer facing higher tariffs). 
 Free trade agreements help solidify transparency and standard setting between nations, 
building on the work of the WTO. They also frequently establish a formal process or committee 




the perspective of U.S. firms – has been one of the major problems in Japan-U.S. relations, a 
reason an FTA between the two countries would be beneficial. 
According to Manger, FTAs coincide with large increases in FDI. Bilateral trade 
agreements (unlike regional or multilateral) generate economic rents by discriminating against 
non-members. This is why strict rules of origin are often placed into FTAs, and non-members are 
forced to settle for most favored nation (MFN) tariffs if they wish to export. Bilateral agreements 
offer a compromise between consumer and producer – the import prices fall because of lower 
tariffs and thus more efficient production from the FTA partner, but competition is restricted, and 
producer surplus also rises. These economic rents would be mutually beneficial for both Japan 
and the U.S. 
 Cross-border disputes dealing with competition policy have often come up between Japan 
and the U.S., especially in regards to market access for the U.S. in Japan. FTAs try to establish 
standards for competition laws that borrow from both counties’ current laws, and harmonize 
them to create one set of laws between the two parties. FTAs often establish national competition 
agencies that assist each other in both understanding and enforcing competition laws, reducing 
conflict between the two countries (Brown and Stern).  
 The WTO is no longer the main player in promoting free trade – the torch has been 
passed to individual nations negotiating bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Another 
development is the emergence of developing nations and rival economic powers to the United 
States – the U.S. is no longer the sole dominant power that can dictate the rules of trade, and has 
reacted to the changing, globalized world by interacting more and establishing ties with 




 If a multitude of regional and bilateral free trade agreements liberalize trade in products 
and services, and move tariffs to zero, this could deliver multilateral free trade, as envisaged by 
the WTO, to the world for many products. 
 Free trade agreements also increase trade between nations by lessening the regulatory 
burden that domestic regulations oftentimes place on foreign competition. FTAs accomplish this 
by facilitating cooperation between each party’s regulatory agency and increasing the level of 
trust in their relationship. This leads to the development of best practices in regulations, not only 
between two countries like Japan and the U.S., but eventually also worldwide. 
For all of the above reasons, and given the issues in the Japan-U.S. alliance, a free trade 
agreement between the two nations would have many benefits. Generally, free trade agreements 
have also been shown to increase trade and facilitate economic benefits for both parties. 
According to Baier and Bergstrand, in a study published for the Journal of International 
Economics, the gravity equation has not been the best way to judge if free trade agreements 
increase members’ international trade, because trade policy is an endogenous, not an exogenous, 
variable. After their analysis Baier and Bergstrand conclude, “Accounting econometrically for 
the FTA variable’s endogeneity yields striking empirical results: the effect of FTAs on trade 
flows is quintupled. We find that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members’ 













 In this subsection, the discussion revolves around why the time is opportune for a 
JUSFTA. We will first analyze past situations that led to Japan agreeing to free trade, and 
compare that to the current proposed JUSFTA. Then, we will look at the various factors which 
now make it an appropriate time to engage in a JUSFTA. There are many political and national 
security factors in the present time that serve as an impetus to a JUSFTA, but because of the 
scope of this paper, the focus will be mostly on the economic factors. In the next subsections, we 
will compare the potential JUSFTA to the completed KORUS FTA, and then analyze research 
demonstrating quantifiable economic benefits of a potential JUSFTA. 
 Mike Mansfield, the US Ambassador to Japan, first proposed a JUSFTA in the late 1980s 
(Nakano). However, at this time there was much tension between the two countries, and Japan 
was seen as the preeminent threat to the American economy, especially in the auto industry, 
essentially rendering any free trade deal impossible. In the past couple decades, China’s rise and 
Japan’s stagnating economy has lessened the threat of Japan to the U.S. and the former tension. 
As China and the U.S. had an aggressive FTA strategy in the early 2000s, Japan saw itself falling 
behind. The two major events that prompted Japan to aggressively pursue an FTA Program was 
the United States entering into the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and 
China negotiating an FTA with ASEAN countries in 2001 (Ahearn). Because the U.S. and the 
EU had lower tariffs on most goods relative to the Far East, Japan decided to focus mostly on 




Japan negotiated its first FTA with Singapore, implemented in November 2002. Since Japan 
does not conduct much agricultural trade with Singapore, there were not many concessions made 
and the deal did not have too large of an impact on either country’s economy. However, it gave 
Japan experience in how to negotiate and structure an FTA.  
 Japan’s next FTA was signed with Mexico and went into effect in April 2005. This was a 
reactive FTA – Japan had been at a competitive disadvantage versus the U.S. ever since NAFTA 
went into effect in 1994. After the Japan-Mexico FTA was concluded, Japan went from facing an 
average Mexican tariff of 16% to a complete phase-out of tariffs on 90% of goods (comprising 
96% of trade volume) through 2015 (Ahearn). With the elimination of these tariffs, the auto and 
steel companies in Japan especially benefited. This agreement was also significant because it was 
the first time Japan significantly reduced protection on some agricultural products, which would 
be required in a JUSFTA.  
 In order to understand how a JUSFTA would become a reality from the Japanese 
perspective, we have to understand the Japanese political system. With frequent turnover and 
elections, Japanese politicians, much more so than American politicians, are in constant threat of 
losing their positions. Because of this constant turnover in Japan’s system, trade policy is more 
influenced by the long-standing bureaucrats, not the elected politicians. For METI bureaucrats, 
their main concern is their constituents; especially since lucrative positions at manufacturing 
firms are often awarded to loyal, retired bureaucrats (Manger). More importantly, in electing 
Japanese House representatives, a rural vote has more than double the amount of influence of an 
urban vote (Nakano). Because agriculture would be the most negatively affected domestic 
Japanese industry in any free trade deal completed with a more efficient agricultural producer, 




such as the U.S. and Australia – and thus, there is much caution for politicians to engage in such 
talks, even if the free trade deals have clear economic benefits. Japan has bicameral 
parliamentary system with a constitutional monarchy (Nakano), lacking the strong presidents 
found in other democracies, such as the U.S. and South Korea, who have more ability to push for 
free trade deals than Japanese prime ministers, who essentially represent their legislature. 
Demands of multilateral firms in Japan will outweigh those of protectionist agricultural forces 
when competitive pressures warrant great lobbying efforts – the case when existing FTAs by 
other countries impose costs on firms with FDI overseas.  Bilateral agreements trigger counter-
agreements by affected third parties, known as defensive FTAs, as opposed to proactive FTAs 
(Manger).  
 Japan’s policy shift resulted because of a defensive reaction to the effects of NAFTA. 
NAFTA put Japanese investors at a disadvantage in Mexico with their U.S. competitors. Japan 
had used its US subsidiaries to import products into Mexico to take advantage of cheap labor, 
process the products, and then re-export. With the conclusion of NAFTA, however, strict rules of 
origin clauses left US subsidiaries to Japanese companies in the dark and at a competitive 
disadvantage to US companies. Unable to reduce tariffs to import products into Mexico, and 
pressured by lobbyists from both Toyota and Nissan, Japan decided that negotiating an FTA was 
a viable policy, even if some agricultural concessions were necessary (Manger). Just as NAFTA 
urged Japan to engage in an FTA with Mexico, so also the recently implemented KORUS FTA 
will serve as an impetus for Japan to engage in free trade talks with the U.S. After NAFTA, 
Japan was at a competitive disadvantage in Mexico; likewise, the South Korean government was 
motivated to sign a free trade agreement with the U.S. to gain a competitive advantage, via lower 




 Furthermore, China’s aggressive FTA moves have fueled Japanese policymakers to try 
and keep pace, perhaps even fueling enough of a pro-FTA base in Japan to overcome staunch 
domestic resistance. 
Exports are more important to the Japanese economy than imports; the opposite is true of 
the U.S. This is also true in the relations between the two nations. U.S. imports from Japan 
consist mostly of passenger cars and parts, computers and components, office machinery parts, 
and electrical machinery; U.S. exports to Japan are much more diverse. The U.S. imports many 
more goods than it exports to Japan; in 2011 the U.S. exported $66.2 billion of merchandise to 
Japan, and imported $128.8 billion, a trade deficit of $62.2 billion (Cooper, U.S.-Japan 
Economic Relations). The U.S. consistently runs trade deficits in its trade with Japan; this is 
partially due to Japan having a more protected, closed market. An FTA between the two nations, 
especially with the national treatment of exporting LNG from the U.S. to Japan, would help 
reduce the U.S.’ trade account deficit in goods.  
The amount of portfolio investment and FDI – defined as investments in which the 
foreign investor owns at least 10% of the entity - exceeds the value of goods and services traded 
between Japan and the U.S. The U.S. has consistently been Japan’s largest source of FDI, in 
2010 investing $113.3 billion. The Japanese economy is relatively closed for a developed nation, 
and its amount of FDI from outside nations consistently ranks at the bottom of the developed 
world. In the 1980s, Japan was the largest source of FDI in the U.S.; today Japan ranks second, 
behind the United Kingdom. In 2010, Japan contributed $257.3 billion in FDI to the U.S. 
(Cooper, U.S.-Japan Economic Relations). As mentioned earlier, FTAs increase the amount of 
FDI between nations – this would be especially beneficial for opening up Japan’s market and 




Since Japan’s markets, especially agricultural, are so heavily protected, and because they 
have to import the majority of their energy sources, the Japanese have to pay very high prices for 
both food and fuel, and this is reflected in their lower standard of living when compared to 
Americans - measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita/GDP (Cooper, U.S.-Japan 
Economic Relations). An FTA with the U.S., if Japan were to open up its agricultural markets in 
any significant manner, would help solve this problem for Japanese citizens as well. 
It is not sufficient to rely on the WTO in facilitating bilateral trade because of the 
organization’s lack of full scope; for example, the WTO does not regulate anything to do with 
competition policy, a major tension between Japan and the U.S. in trade matters – thus, an FTA 
is advantageous from this standpoint as well. 
 A free trade agreement allows both parties to address concerns and policies that they find 
relevant. Also, an FTA is viable between Japan and the U.S. because tariffs between the two 
countries are already relatively low, and the alliance is fairly strong. 
 According to The Australian, Australian officials believe that newly re-elected Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s (who is also the former Liberal Democratic Party prime minister 
who, in his first term, had unsuccessfully pushed for a free trade deal with Australia) 
appointments of Harvard graduates Toshimitsu Motegi and Yoshimasa Hayashi as trade and 
agriculture ministers is a welcome sign for trade liberalization and agricultural reform (Wallace) 










In this subsection, we look at the free trade agreement reached between the U.S. and 
South Korea, and see how it can serve as an impetus and a template for a JUSFTA. Japan and 
South Korea, more so than any other U.S. FTA partners, have a similar culture and economy, 
and many of the issues that have kept a JUSFTA from coming to fruition were also obstacles for 
the eventual KORUS FTA – especially the automotive, agricultural (especially rice), and 
insurance sectors.  
More specifically, the free trade deal completed with South Korea serves as a great 
template for one with Japan due to the many similarities between the two countries. Japan and 
South Korea are both democratic countries, both primarily ethnically homogenous, and both are 
divided into two major parties. The South Koreans are divided by region into the Grand National 
Party and the Democratic Party. The Japanese are divided via an urban-rural split into the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan. Both countries have strong agricultural 
industries that have experienced slowing relative growth in recent decades, both politically have 
strong farm lobbies, both claim rice as their primary crop, both have highly protectionist policies 
to protect its rice farmers, and both have rural areas that are overrepresented politically. In terms 
of economic ties with the U.S., both countries were at once highly protectionist and closed 
markets, but have both embraced neoliberal trade policies in recent decades due to sluggish 
economies in the 1990s. Both consider the U.S. as one of their top trading partners, and both rely 
on the U.S. for security and military support. South Korea, obviously, has taken things a step 
further by agreeing to the KORUS FTA and opening up its market beyond what Japan has 




compete with Japanese autos and electronics in the U.S. Nevertheless, both countries encourage 
savings and investment over consumption. Also, South Korea and Japan tend to import and 
export (for example, both export manufactured goods, like many automobiles and electronics) 
similar products from and to the U.S.  Lastly, both have relied on the U.S. for military support 
and for help in reforming their respective economies, but both have also begun to strengthen 
their economic ties with China (Nakano). For all of these reasons, the recent KORUS FTA 
serves as a great template for a JUSFTA. 
The free trade agreement reached between the United States and South Korea that was 
put into force on March 15, 2012 serves as a great template for what is possible between Japan 
and the United States, and in many ways is a historical first for the United States. Just as Japan is 
an important trading partner for the United States, and just as Japan and the United States have 
many disagreements that make an agreement difficult to complete, the same conditions were true 
between the United States and South Korea. Just as with Japan, the U.S. has a trade deficit with 
South Korea (of $10.9 billion). For South Korea, at the time of the signing in 2010, the United 
States was its third largest trading partner (following only China and Japan), and for the United 
States, South Korea was its seventh largest trading partner. Up until 2003, the United States was 
South Korea’s largest trading partner (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA).  
The United States sought the free trade agreement to gain market access for its imports, 
especially in agriculture, medical devices and pharmaceuticals, services, and FDI. U.S. exporters 
often cited structural issues, especially missing transparency in South Korea’s regulations and 
trading system, as the major barrier to trade. In some industries, especially automobiles, the U.S. 
believed South Korea had regulations that discriminated against foreign competition – the same 




For South Korea, the main motivation was to use the agreement as a way to make 
necessary economic reforms and also to be more competitive with the Japanese within the United 
States, especially in autos and some manufactured goods (like electronics). In response to this 
deal, Japan will have a similar motivation to strike a free trade deal with the U.S. – to eliminate 
the advantage that South Korea obtained over Japan in autos and electronics exports. Plus, 
Japan’s economy and especially its agricultural industry, which has kept its food prices at 
relatively high prices for an industrialized nation, is in need of reform, much like South Korea’s 
was.  South Korea was not interested so much in getting more market access in the United States 
(the U.S. already has a relatively very open market), but were more interested in preserving its 
share of the market in response to all the free trade deals the U.S. was undertaking, especially 
with other Southeast Asian nations. Also, South Korea wanted to improve its own services 
industry, and bringing in U.S. competition would do just that. Both the United States and South 
Korea also saw the free trade agreement as a way to strengthen their diplomatic and national 
security ties – something that would be beneficial to both the Japan and the U.S. in a time of a 
threatening North Korea and a rising China. Japan is concerned about its regional security and its 
economic prowess – an FTA and the easier access to U.S. LNG as a result would help 
accomplish this; the U.S., on the other hand, is concerned with counterbalancing a rising China 
whose economic relationship with Japan has grown stronger – a concern that could be assuaged 
with the completion of a JUSFTA and the accompanying LNG trade. 
An agreement like the KORUS FTA would have been almost impossible to reach in the 
1980s and 1990s. South Korea, much like Japan, was also somewhat closed to foreign 
competition and market access. However, in 1997 its economy nearly collapsed, and the follow-




the United States, prompted South Korea to reform its economy. After the bailout, South Korea 
opened up its markets to large amounts of FDI and loosened some significant barriers to trade. 
 The agreement was first signed on June 30, 2007. The original negotiations were 
conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA) of 2002, which gave President Bush the 
authority to submit the final deal as legislation to Congress. This expired under President Obama 
and was not renewed. However, some disagreements between the two countries, especially 
following a new Congress and an Obama Administration, kept it from being implemented until 
three years later. After much negotiating, President Obama and Korean President Lee Myung-
bak announced on December 3, 2010 that necessary concessions had been made and that they 
were ready to send the final deal to their respective legislations. The negotiations resulted in 
some key differences from the 2007 agreement, mostly centered around tariffs, concessions, and 
provisions on autos. It was the second largest free trade agreement reached by South Korea and 
the United States at the time (a free trade agreement with NAFTA being larger for the United 
States and a free trade agreement with the European Union being larger for South Korea). Public 
opinion, much like it is for a JUSFTA, was not always positive during the process – during the 
talks, there were often massive anti-FTA demonstrations by South Korean farmers and union 
members (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA). The same could be expected in the case of a JUSFTA, 
given the Japanese agricultural industry’s strong opposition to trade liberalization with the U.S. 
Nevertheless, the South Korean government was able to work past this, and, although a different 
political system, it is possible for Japan to follow the same mold, especially by using the anti-





 In the following sub-subsection, we will analyze specific roadblocks to a JUSFTA and 
how these roadblocks were addressed in the KORUS FTA: 
 
Japan-U.S. trade issues 
 
As aforementioned in the introduction to this paper, Japanese restrictions on U.S. beef 
imports, regulations and policies that favor state-run insurance companies like Japan Post, and 
market access for the U.S. automobile manufacturers, are three major areas Obama cited that 
need improvement before the U.S. would endorse Japan’s entry into the TPP. 
 Although this paper assumes Japan does not enter the TPP, the same three criteria will be 
important before a JUSFTA can be reached. Below, we outline some of the historical differences 
that have caused frictions preventing a JUSFTA. 
 In Japan, the most vocal critic of a JUSFTA would be the agricultural industry. The 
TPP’s most vocal dissenter in Japan is, unsurprisingly, JA, the national agricultural cooperative 
and powerful lobbying force. JA has teamed with Japan Medical Association. JA wishes to 
protect its small, inefficient farmers’ operations and keep subsidies and tariffs in place. Japan 
Medical Association claims that open market access will lead to higher prices for medicine and 
medical equipment, and also threaten universal healthcare (Cooper, U.S.-Japan Economic 
Relations).    
One of the major areas of trade friction between Japan and the U.S. has been in the 
agricultural sector, with one of the highest profile conflicts of this millennium between the 
countries occurring in the beef sector. Japan banned all U.S. beef imports from the U.S. in 




was not until July 2006 (save for a brief month long period in between when imports were 
allowed) that Japan resumed importing U.S. beef, but only from cattle 20 months or younger. 
The U.S. has implored Japan ever since to lift its stringent restrictions; South Korea, in a similar 
position, imports cattle 30 months and younger, for example. The issue is ongoing, and talks 
continue between the two nations. The U.S.’ goal is that Japan allows imports of U.S. beef that 
conform to international standards as set by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
(Cooper, U.S.-Japan Economic Relations). 
 The services industry has also been a major concern between Japan and the U.S. One 
major area of discussion has been market access for U.S. insurance companies in Japan. U.S. 
insurance companies have asserted that there is a lack of transparency with how Japan makes 
regulations and that public information is not easily found. U.S. insurance companies currently 
do business in Japan based on agreements made in 1994 and 1996 ensuring competitive 
conditions for foreign providers. However, U.S. insurance providers have complained that 
Kampo, the government owned insurance company under the Japan Postal Service, and other 
state-run insurance cooperatives have an unfair advantage because they do not have to comply 
with the same regulations as do private insurance companies. On October 1, 2007, legislation 
was introduced that would lead to the privatization of the Japanese insurance market within ten 
years. However, with a change of government, on March 30, 2012, a bill was introduced into the 
Japanese Diet (legislature), which is believed to have the effects of essentially rolling back the 
progress that was agreed upon in 2007 (Cooper, U.S.-Japan Economic Relations). 
In the U.S., the most vocal critic of a JUSFTA would likely be the automobile industry. 
The U.S. automobile industry has a very bitter relationship with Japan, dating back to the 1970s 




Toyota and Honda, into the U.S. threatened its operations. In response to restraints, many of 
these Japanese car companies moved some of their operations into the U.S. In addition, U.S. 
automobile companies believed that the Japanese employed several methods to restrict the 
success of foreign-made cars in Japan. In 2010, U.S. car sales accounted for 0.2% of all 
automobiles sold in Japan, paling in comparison to the 26% market share captured by the 
Japanese for light vehicles in 2010 in the U.S. These allegations of a lack of transparency and 
biased safety/certification regulations continue to this very day, a major reason why Chrysler, 
Ford, and General Motors - the Detroit Big Three – have disapproved Japan’s possible entry into 
the TPP (Cooper, U.S.-Japan Economic Relations).  
Currently, issues raised by the U.S. include encouraging more competition and 
transparency in the communications sector, improving intellectual property rights protections, 
improving competition in the information technology sector, leveling the playing field for private 
insurance companies with the services of the Japan postal system, and reforming policies on 
reimbursements for pharmaceuticals and medical devices to promote innovation (Cooper, U.S.-
Japan Economic Relations). 
 Ending the economic stagnation, high debt, and deflation of the past decades, reforming 
the domestic economy, maintaining influence in East Asia, and avoiding economic 
discrimination are the major reasons Japan has begun to seriously consider multiple free trade 
agreements, and would be major general reasons for Japan to agree to a JUSFTA. 







KORUS FTA solutions 
 
For two thirds of U.S. agricultural products, South Korea agreed to eliminate all tariffs 
immediately, with most other agricultural tariffs gradually being reduced to zero over a ten-year 
period. The USITC (United States International Trade Commission) estimates that U.S. 
agricultural exports will be $1.9 billion to $3.8 billion higher because of the agreement. Because 
South Korea exports so little agricultural products to the U.S., it was agreed that all tariffs on 
U.S. imports from South Korea would be removed (at most within 15 years) (Cooper, et al., 
KORUS FTA). In negotiations, the main area of disagreement and negotiation centered on beef, 
rice, and oranges. Given the importance of beef and rice to Japan, this paper will focus on the 
KORUS FTA’s handling of these two agricultural products. 
South Korea had experienced the same problem Japan experienced with U.S. beef 
imports during the outbreak of mad cow disease. By 2007, Korea resumed importing U.S. 
boneless beef from cattle that was 30 months old or younger, more generous than the Japanese 
20 month limit. During negotiations, it was decided that South Korea would reduce its 40% tariff 
on beef imports to zero over a 15-year period, but the United States was unable to convince 
South Korea to open up access to all U.S. beef imports deemed safe by international standards. 
The 15-year phase out includes a safeguard, where South Korea can re-impose the original tariff 
if U.S. imports increase beyond a certain amount (with the specified trigger amount increasing 
by 2% each year over the 15 years). The U.S. beef sector has voiced its approval for the deal. 
Almost half of the aforementioned increase in agricultural products was estimated to be in the 
beef sector (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA). Japan remains stricter with the U.S. on beef imports; 




restrictions on U.S. beef imports, increasing trade between the two nations, satisfying one of the 
Obama administration’s chief concerns, and leading to a JUSFTA. 
Rice, an integral staple of the Korean culture, was an issue that South Korea refused to 
budge on. Although the United States wished to open up market access for its rice producers, the 
deal risked being completely niched if the United States did not make this exception. Karan 
Bhatia, a top U.S. trade official, said, “Ultimately, the questions that confronted us was whether 
to accept a very, very good albeit less perfect agreement or to lose the entire agreement because 
South Korea refused to move on rice” (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA). Therefore, any reduction or 
elimination on tariffs of rice imports was excluded from the deal. This is important because rice 
is also the primary and most protected agricultural product in Japan; and realistically the U.S. 
would have to accept excluding changes in rice tariffs from a JUSFTA. Following this precedent 
set by the KORUS FTA will help overcome one of the largest potential obstacles to agreeing on 
a JUSFTA. 
Discussions over the automobile sector were some of the hardest areas for negotiators to 
find agreement, and there were many changes in the 2010 agreement that took place in order for 
the deal to get U.S. Congressional support and also support from the three major U.S. auto 
companies. The U.S. was concerned about policies that discriminated against U.S. auto imports. 
In the new 2010 agreement, it was agreed that, unlike the immediate elimination of tariffs in the 
2007 agreement, the United States would eliminate its 2.5% and 8% tariffs on South Korean 
imports five years after deal completion. South Korea reduced its 8% tariffs on U.S. passenger 
cars to 4% immediately. Tariffs on electric cars will be phased out over a five-year period. The 
immediate elimination of South Korea’s 10% tariff on trucks remained the same from the 2007 




place – eight years, with a complete elimination of the tariff not occurring until after ten years. 
There was also a snapback provision added that gave the United States the right to bring back its 
2.5% tariff on passenger cars if U.S. automakers deemed there had been a broach of the free 
trade agreement by South Korea in regards to safety and environmental standards (Cooper, et al., 
KORUS FTA).  
 Additionally, U.S. automakers were concerned about a large increase in South Korean 
auto imports. In order to address this, in 2010 special motor vehicle safeguard was agreed upon.  
If “any harmful surges in Korean auto imports due to the agreement” happened, the U.S. would 
have the right to re-impose its passenger car and truck tariffs. The 2010 agreement also raised the 
threshold for the number of vehicles U.S. automakers could export to South Korea from 6,500 
per automaker to 25,000 per automaker, annually (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA).  
 Before the agreement, South Korea had taxed discriminatorily high rates on vehicles with 
large engine capacities, the very type that was imported from the United States. As part of the 
agreement, these discriminatory effects were reduced and more transparency promised. In 
addition, South Korea promised to be more transparent about new auto regulations, giving U.S. 
companies one year after passage to comply with any new regulations. U.S. automobiles were 
also given exemptions from meeting newly implemented South Korean environmental standards. 
Finally, the agreement created an Automotive Working Group that was to meet annually to 
discuss and resolve any relevant issues (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA). 
 The USITC estimates that U.S. auto exports to South Korea will increase by $300 
million-$400 million, whereas South Korean imports into the U.S. will increase by $1.3-1.7 
billion. However, many of the increased South Korean imports will replace other, mostly 




 Of the big three Detroit automakers, only GM did not voice opposition to the original 
2007 deal. However, Ford expressed approval of the modifications that were made in the 2010 
version. Automotive parts suppliers and broader industry groups were mostly supportive, while 
labor groups were split. The United Auto Workers (UAW), one very important labor group, 
announced support for the agreement, whereas the AFL-CIO opposed it, citing concern for U.S. 
jobs (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA). Nevertheless, the KORUS FTA established provisions that 
will protect U.S. automakers in the case of surges in South Korean auto imports, and also 
established regulation changes in South Korea so that U.S. exports would not face 
discrimination. Given market access for U.S. automobile manufacturers was one of Obama’s 
three listed priorities before engaging in free trade talks with Japan, the KORUS FTA sets up a 
precedent to eliminate a major hurdle for a JUSFTA. 
As mentioned earlier, two major U.S. concerns with Japan are reforming policies on 
reimbursements for pharmaceuticals and medical devices to promote innovation, and improving 
intellectual property rights protections. Prior to the KORUS FTA, U.S. exporters of 
pharmaceuticals had cited many grievances against the South Korean government for unfair 
regulations that favored domestically produced, generic drugs and other regulations hampering 
market access. Makers of innovative pharmaceuticals were happy that the agreement improved 
upon intellectual property rights protection, disallowing generic drugs from copying original 
drugs as soon as they are introduced. In these two areas, the KORUS FTA certainly sets a 
precedent for a JUSFTA. 
In terms of foreign investment, the major issue between South Korea and the U.S. was 
that South Korea had restrictions in place in some sectors making foreign investment more 




an issue. The FTA made a lot of improvement in these areas by establishing a national treatment 
principle, meaning that foreign investors from one country will be treated just as favorably as 
domestic investors, and any exceptions needed to be stated in the FTA. For any exceptions, the 
most-favored-nation treatment would apply – that foreign investors would be treated just as well 
as investors from any other third-party nation, a principle established by the WTO. In addition, 
each government agreed to extended national treatment to the other in terms of intellectual 
property rights, and agreed on principles that increased the transparency for and rights of 
intellectual property holders. The USITC estimated that U.S. investors in financial services will 
likely gain from this agreement (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA). These agreements in the KORUS 
FTA set a precedent for a JUSFTA since two major U.S. concerns were reforming intellectual 
property rights protections and encouraging more competition and transparency in the 
communications sector. 
For services, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to a “negative” list, where all services 
would be liberalized unless said otherwise, and any new services would be liberalized unless a 
special exception was agreed upon between the two countries. Before the agreement, South 
Korea’s insurance market, the world’s seventh largest, regulated private-sector foreign and 
domestic insurance companies, but there was no regulation of the state-owned Korea Post and 
the cooperative insurance providers. The KORUS FTA, however, established that they are to be 
regulated by an independent state regulator, assuaging many of the complaints from U.S. 
insurance companies in South Korea. Overall, U.S. services providers largely approved the 
agreement (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA). Given that regulations and policies that favor state-run 
insurance companies like Japan Post was the one remaining criteria that Obama cited as needing 




Post sets a great precedent for a JUSFTA’s handling of Japan Post. With this third and final 
major criterion addressed, the KORUS FTA sets a great precedent for satisfying U.S. concerns 
and engaging in a JUSFTA. Additionally, transparency, competition laws, and conflict resolution 
were addressed in the KORUS FTA, setting precedents for necessary provisions in a JUSFTA. 
Upon completion of the agreement, South Korean President Lee was pleased because he 
believed the KORUS FTA would help revitalize the Korean economy, and especially better 
compete with Japan in the U.S. (Cooper, et al., KORUS FTA). Both the U.S. and South Korea 
signed the agreement in part to also strengthen their foreign policy and national security alliance. 
How to deal with North Korea and how to position U.S. troops in South Korea had resulted in 
past disagreements between South Korea and the U.S., and this agreement strengthens their 
relationship and will help in such matters. Likewise, Japan desires influence in the East Asian 
area and would ideally like to counter South Korea’s gains over Japan in the U.S. – both of 
which could be accomplished in a JUSFTA. Using the KORUS FTA as an impetus and a 
precedent to engage in a JUSFTA, it is important to note that the domestic opposition that has 
stifled a JUSFTA since the 1980s will not be absent. The special circumstance that can serve as 
the main impetus for Japan to engage in a JUSFTA and overcome domestic opposition is a 
perfect match of a need and a capability – Japan’s energy needs and the bountiful supply of LNG 
in the U.S. 
 
 There are two key takeaways from this discussion. First, because of the KORUS FTA, 
Japanese firms now are discriminated against in their trade with the U.S., relative to South 
Korea, because Japanese firms are FTA non-members with the U.S. The higher tariffs put them 




impetus for South Korea to implement the KORUS FTA, so also the KORUS FTA serves as an 
impetus for Japan to implement a JUSFTA. The second key takeaway is subtler, and is one of the 
major points of the paper. We have seen that major free trade agreements have often required a 
special event or circumstance to propel their completion. For South Korea, the IMF bailout and 
the need to reform its economy was the special circumstance. Japan has a much different, albeit 
still noteworthy, circumstance that could propel it to undergo serious negotiations for a JUSFTA 
– its energy needs. With the U.S.’ capability of exporting LNG, and the U.S.’ reliable and trusted 
position in Japan, the Fukushima Daiichi disaster and the resulting energy crisis could serve as 
an impetus to a JUSFTA just as the IMF bailout served as an impetus for the KORUS FTA.  
 
The Benefits of a JUSFTA 
 
The previous sections and subsections have established the ideal match between U.S. 
LNG exporting capabilities and Japan’s energy needs, the benefits of FTAs in general, and the 
precedent that the KORUS FTA has set for a JUSFTA. This subsection analyzes the potential 
quantifiable benefits of a JUSFTA. Although research is limited on a hypothetical JUSFTA, 
there have been some professors who have undertaken the task of quantifying the benefits that 
would result from such a deal. This subsection explains the findings, especially the findings 
behind a detailed study conducted by Scott Bradford, Professor at Brigham Young University. 
Overall, a JUSFTA would result in political, diplomatic, national security, and economic 
benefits. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a JUSFTA will help solidify political and 
diplomatic ties between Japan and the U.S. – this is especially important for Japan in regards to 




a nuclear North Korea. However, the focus of this subsection, in accordance with this paper, will 
be the potential economic benefits. 
As aforementioned, free trade agreements between two nations in practice discriminate 
economically against non-partners who are at a disadvantage due to the resulting relatively 
higher tariffs and imposed restrictions in the non-partners’ trade with the host country. South 
Korea’s recent FTAs with the U.S. and another with the E.U. (tentatively went into effect July 1, 
2011 and at the time of completion was the second largest FTA in history, following NAFTA) 
combined will negatively affect Japan’s economy (Nakano), and could serve as an economic 
impetus for Japan to welcome JUSFTA negotiations.  
In August 2006, the Chairman of the Japanese Economic Foundation (JEF), an 
organization formed in 1981 to promote Japanese economic and technological exchange in the 
international community, strongly supported the negotiation of a JUSFTA and also asserted that, 
if completed, the KORUS FTA should compel Japan to engage in free trade talks with the U.S. 
(Hatakeyama). 
Based on fitted values from a standard gravity equation, Moore and Bellotti find that only 
the European Union stacks up as having higher potential than Japan in trade and investment 
potential among over 150 individual countries. As an individual country (since the E.U. is a 
collection of nations), Japan ranked highest in providing the greatest level of U.S. trade and 
investment opportunities, one aspect that is important when considering different free trade 
partners. One limitation is that the study uses older data – FDI data and GDP data, for example 
(respectively obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicator table) are from 2002. Although this is not ideal, Japan ranking the highest 




U.S. today still ranking among the world’s top economies, indicates that one decade later, it is 
safe to assume Japan likely ranks among the highest of all potential U.S. FTA partners. 
However, this study, and the gravity equation generally, does not quantify the effect a JUSFTA 
would have on U.S. GDP.   
A more robust study, An analysis of a possible Japan-US trade agreement by Scott 
Bradford, was presented to the JEF on November 27, 2007. Although the study and the 
presentation are several years old, Japan and the U.S. still remain two of the world’s great 
economies and the study can still be viewed as an estimate for potential benefits that would 
accrue to each nation due to a JUSFTA. In his analysis, Bradford demonstrates that an FTA 
between Japan and the United States would have potentially large economic benefits as well as 
pave the way for a stable global trading system. Both Japan and the U.S. would benefit, as well 
as the world economy, by freeing up important markets and enabling important domestic reforms 
in Japan. According to the analysis, a full JUSFTA, assuming a conservative 10% liberalization 
of services, would roughly double trade between the two nations (according to a gravity model 
analysis) and would increase Japan’s net welfare by 2.7% of GDP (about $130 billion at 2007 
levels) and the U.S.’s welfare by 1.1% of GDP (about $150 billion annually). Due to the heavy 
protectionism of Japan’s rice industry, and from the precedent that was set in the KORUS FTA, 
it is likely that Japanese rice would be excluded from the potential free trade agreement. 
Interestingly, the study reveals that excluding rice does not greatly change the benefit for the 
U.S.; rather, the U.S. slightly gains in the model from the FTA if rice is excluded – mostly due to 
the fact that the U.S.-subsidized rice and opening up of Japan’s market to the U.S. would shift 
many resources to this sector. In the likely case that rice is excluded from a JUSFTA (like it was 




not change significantly. If 30% of services were liberalized, the gains could be much greater, 
estimated to be 7% of GDP ($350 billion) for Japan and 2.6% GDP (also $350 billion) for the 
U.S., annually (Bradford).  
 Dropping the liberalization of services greatly diminished the benefit estimates in the 
study. Liberalizing services would help diminish the negative effects of layoffs from sectors hurt 
by the opening up of free trade. Secondly, liberalizing services would be an impetus to help 
Japan make necessary domestic economic reforms.  
 With Japan seeking free trade agreements with the European Union and many countries 
in Southeast Asia, as well as considering a trilateral trade agreement with South Korea and 
China, a free trade agreement with Japan would greatly benefit the U.S. by avoiding trade 
discrimination, especially in the East Asia region. If free trade is not sought with Japan, then the 
U.S. will be at a disadvantage in trade to Japan, forced to pay higher tariffs than its competitors.  
 The analysis asserts that there is now a unique opportunity to seek a free trade agreement 
with Japan. Economic friction between Japan and the U.S. is at a recent historic low. With the 
rise of China and recent Japanese economic struggles, the U.S. no longer sees Japan as the threat 
it once perceived in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Japan, still the most closed market of the 
developed economic super weights, has also made many economic reforms in the past decades 
that make negotiating more possible. In the Uruguay Round of the WTO, Japan eased up on its 
agricultural barriers to trade. Japanese financial markets are much more accessible to U.S. 
investors than they were in the 1990s, and antitrust and merger standards have been modernized. 
Most importantly, the KORUS FTA laid down a foundation for a very real possibility at what a 
JUSFTA could be. Furthermore, South Korea is a major rival to Japan in the manufacturing 




Asian neighbors in the U.S. markets. Both countries have also undertaken a proliferation of 
bilateral free trade agreements in the past couple decades. Japan’s FTA with Mexico was 
significant in that it was the first time Japan agreed to significantly open up its agriculture. 
Furthermore, Japan has held significant discussion for a free trade agreement with agriculture 
powerhouse Australia, which, if the deal gets done, would require Japan to open up its 
agriculture markets significantly.  
 In his analysis, Bradford used a multi-sector, global applied general equilibrium (AGE) 
model – the model has 39 sectors, five factors of productions, and eight regions.  A standard 
economic structure was used: perfect competition, constant returns to scale, full employment, 
and factors more between sectors but not regions. Some domestic sectors are negatively affected, 
but this could be handled by both governments through adjustment assistance. Japan especially 
can look towards the Korean plan to buy out its farmers over 10 years for $135 billion – the U.S. 
could possibly consider assistance for its autoworkers (Bradford). 
 Bradford is not unsupported in his positive assessment of the economic benefits of a 
JUSFTA. At the November 27, 2007 JEF conference, Shujiro Urata, a professor at Waseda 
University who specialized in international economics, presented a separate study that also had 
results of strong benefits arising for both Japan and the U.S. if a JUSFTA was enforced. The 
benefits go beyond GDP economics as well - a JUSFTA would be an impetus for well-needed 
reforms of Japan’s intellectual property system and other regulatory systems and standards, and 
also would lead to an exchange of people, students, and ideas. Urata’s simulation asserted that 
Japan and the U.S. would both benefit economically from a JUSFTA, with Japan realizing the 




temporary relief for negatively affected workers (for example, farmers in Japan and auto/steel 
workers in the U.S.) in each country as a means to overcome domestic opposition to a JUSFTA. 
 Although there has been an insufficient amount of studies done on the potential benefits 
of a JUSFTA to reach any conclusive, definite remarks, the few studies that have been done by 
respected professors demonstrate that free trade would lead to likely large potential benefits for 
both Japan and the U.S. Certainly, it would lead to a large increase in trade and investment 
opportunities between the two nations, which would invariably strengthen the important but 




With long-term contracts expiring, Japan has a current need to negotiate new LNG long-
term contracts and has expressed a desire to import a significant amount of LNG from the U.S. 
As of now, only one of the U.S. LNG export facilities has been approved to export to non-FTA 
countries. Forming an FTA with the U.S. would help Japan accelerate the LNG trade process and 
ensure this reliable LNG supply, assuming it fails to join the TPP negotiations. The Japanese 
energy crisis can serve as an impetus for a JUSFTA, just as the IMF bailout was an impetus for 
the KORUS FTA. Furthermore, the KORUS FTA in many ways can serve as an impetus and a 
template for a JUSFTA. There is much support that demonstrates the political, diplomatic, and 
macroeconomic – the focus of this paper - benefits of a potential JUSFTA. Because of this, and 
because of the matching of a capability and a need, a JUSFTA is an ideal means to satisfy the 
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Appendix of commonly used abbreviations: 
 
ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Bcf/d - Billion cubic feet per day 
DOE - United States Department of Energy 
DOE/FE - Office of Fossil Energy at the U.S. Department of Energy 
EIA - Energy Information Administration 
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment 
FERC - Federal Energy Regulation Commission 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
JEF - Japanese Economic Foundation 
JUSFTA - Japan-United States Free Trade Agreement 
KORUS FTA - South Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement 
LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas 
MMBtu - Million British thermal units 
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement 
Tcf - Trillion cubic feet 
USITC - United States International Trade Commission 
WTO - World Trade Organization 
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